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Abstract
What is tax? What is administrative fee? It is the first 
question to be proposed in the study on administrative 
fee. Connotations and denotations of administrative fee 
could be only determined based on the comparison of 
administrative fee and tax. The prime difference between 
tax and fee could be seen from the following three 
points. First of all, the purpose of collection is different. 
The purpose or attached purpose for the government to 
collect tax is to increase fiscal revenues, and offer general 
and ordinary government services to the public. While 
the purpose to collect fee is to make up the cost spent 
in specific services for sake of individuals. Secondly, 
tax refers to public debts without reciprocal payment, 
while fee refers to reciprocal payment of specific public 
services. Thirdly, tax compliant with “capability payment 
principle” determines tax rate according to “taxation on 
capability principle” in measuring taxation liability. While 
by contrast, fee compliant with “user payment principle” 
or “beneficiary payment principle” determines rate 
according to “cost or fee compensation principle” or “fee 
coverage principle” in measuring payment liability.
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INTRODUTION
As for the difference between tax and fee, some scholars 
draw a conclusion in three aspects. Firstly, from the 
perspective of public goods theory, tax is based on pure 
public goods, while fee is based on quasi public goods. 
Secondly, from the perspective of civil society theory, tax 
is collected forcibly and voluntarily, while fee is collected 
as per civil autonomy and reciprocal transaction rules. 
Thirdly, from the perspective of debt model, there exist 
numerous differences between tax debt and specific fee 
debt with regard to formation, property composition, 
content, efficiency and execution. (Liu & Xiong, 2017)
Some scholars hold that the fundamental difference 
between administrative fee and tax consists in the 
congruity between administrative fee payer and 
administrative fee beneficiary. In this sense, administrative 
fee is non-gratuitous. However, such congruity between 
taxation liability and benefit is not so oblivious or explicit. 
(Jiang, 2012)
As pointed out by some scholars, although both 
administrative fee and tax are administrative collection 
actions imposed by the state to raise fiscal revenues 
from the society, the difference between the two remains 
rather significant. In terms of collection subject, the 
collection subject of administrative fee is scattered in 
shortage of exclusive agency, while administrative tax is 
in the charge of exclusive agency. In terms of collection 
purpose, administrative fee is collected by the government 
as special expenditure for administrative intervention 
in the market, while administrative tax is raised by the 
government as universal administrative expenditure to 
enrich fiscal revenues. In terms of function, administrative 
fee is appropriated for particular purposes or particular 
interests of individuals, while administrative tax benefits 
the general public by uniform fiscal budget.
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Despite the controversy as stated above, scholars have 
reached a consensus over the difference between tax and 
fee in terms of collection purpose, reciprocal payment, 
collection principle, coerciveness, and public goods. The 
following sections will respectively analyze these aspects 
in detail. 
1.   D IFFERENCE IN COLLECTION 
PURPOSE 
1 . 1   I n c r e a s i n g  F i s c a l  R e v e n u e s  a n d 
Compensating the Cost of Specific Activities 
There is no doubt that the purpose of tax is to increase 
fiscal revenues. From the perspective of safeguarding state 
fiscal revenues, Public Finance insists that the purpose of 
government tax collection should be the increase of fiscal 
revenues. This is up to the coercive, non-gratuitous and 
fixed properties of tax. In the field of Tax Law, tax is also 
collected for fiscal revenues. If tax departs from fiscal 
revenues to exist as a pure prohibitive means, or is banned 
in practice, it will run counter to the tenet of tax. (Xiong & 
Liu, 2004) Public Finance illustrates the fiscal significance 
of tax as the major criterion in the analysis on tax and non-
tax. At the same time, it indicates that if an action totally 
separates itself from fiscal purposes, but executes pure 
economic imposition in the form of tax for prohibitive 
effects, such tax will not be the tax in traditional sense. 
(Xiong & Liu, 2004))According to Taiwan scholar Prof. 
Ge Kechang, “tax as the payment obligation prescribed by 
law must serve for fiscal revenues, or at least be collected 
for fiscal revenues as a subordinate consideration. Tax not 
collected for sake of fiscal revenues does not exist at all. 
As for the prohibition of tax, it is neither for revenues nor 
consistent with the work right and property right defended 
by Constitution. In a manner of speaking, it already 
becomes extinct in modern law-based states.”(Ge, 1997)
Comparing with tax, government fee is not collected 
to increase fiscal revenues. Different from tax which 
primarily solves the funding source problems in state 
expenditure, fee is particular expenditure in administrative 
activities oriented towards specific individuals. Now 
that the insufficiency of fiscal fund is not attributed to 
specific individuals, tax should not be compensated 
by administrative fee.”(Liu, 2000) Administrative fee 
constitutes the regular source of government fiscal 
revenues. Undeniably, administrative fee indeed 
compensates government fund at present, but it does not 
mean that such function has any relation to collection 
purpose. In other words, although administrative 
fee objectively makes up government fund, it is still 
inappropriate to claim that administrative fee is collected 
to increase fiscal revenues. This should be attributable 
to its non-conformity with the legitimacy basis of 
administrative fee. 
In 2013, American Tax Foundation issued the report 
How Is the Money Used? Federal and State Cases 
Distinguishing Taxes and Fees written by Joseph Bishop-
Henchman. According to this report, the most critical 
difference between tax and fee should be the purpose 
of government collection. If the collection purpose is to 
increase government fiscal revenues, and offer common 
and ordinary government services to the public, it must 
be tax. By contrast, if the purpose is to compensate the 
cost of specific services for sake of individuals, it must be 
fee. (Joseph, 2013) This criterion of differentiation also 
has reflection in the judicial precedents of America. This 
report analyzes the precedents of all states concerning tax 
and fee, only to find that most state courts have followed 
this criterion. For instance, in 1992, in case San Juan 
Cellular Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission 
of Puerto Rico, San Juan Cellular requested Federal 
District Court to judge the illegality of Public Service 
Commission’s claim for 3% “regular fee”. The pursuit 
was supported by the court. Afterwards, Public Service 
Commission lodged an appeal, by defending that the 
“regular fee” was tax. Moreover, it pointed out that 
Federal District Court did not have the right of jurisdiction 
by reference to Butler case. Rejected by the Circuit Court 
of Appeal, it judged that Public Service Commission 
aimed to compensate its supervision cost by collecting 
3% “regular fee” rather than increase government fiscal 
revenues. In this sense, it was fee instead of tax. 
In Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Cobb County 
case, Bellsouth needed to install circuit on the public 
roads of Cob County, and Cobb County Government 
collected license fee in accordance with relevant laws 
and regulations. However, Bellsouth viewed it as tax, 
and insisted the county government did not have any 
right to collect tax against Constitution. The court judged 
that local government had right to rationally collect 
supervision fee covered by the police power. On the 
contrary, the tax collection right for sake of revenues must 
be conferred by the law. The county government had been 
endowed with the supervision right over the circuit to be 
installed on the public roads of Cob County. Therefore, 
the county government had the right to charge license fee 
from Bellsouth. It should be noted here that the license 
fee is used to compensate administrative cost related to 
the supervision activity, but not to create government 
revenues. As clearly shown by the record, the county 
government collects license fee for compensating the 
actual cost in licensing process. Therefore, it is fee instead 
of tax. 
To sum up, the difference between tax and fee lies 
first in collection purpose. The action that aims to 
increase fiscal revenues is tax, while the action that aims 
to compensate government cost in particular activities 
for individuals is fee, such as all sorts of license fee, real 
estate registration fee, etc. The purpose for the government 
to collect such fee is not to increase fiscal revenues, but to 
compensate supervision cost instead. 
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1.2  How to Determine Collection Purpose 
Now that the collection purpose is so important, how 
should people determine the collection purpose of 
government? This question becomes more urgent 
especially after the emergence of purpose tax. This 
paper considers that the first step to determine collection 
purpose is to check how the revenue will be used. If 
the revenue is used for the public interests of whole 
society, then the purpose of collection is to increase fiscal 
revenues from tax. Whereas, if the revenue is used for 
compensating the cost of particular government services 
or interests, then it is administrative fee. Secondly, 
supposing the purpose for the government to operate a 
department is to offer service to benefited individuals, 
and it requires 100 thousand RMB for operation, if the fee 
collected from benefited individuals approaches the cost, 
then government collection purpose is not to increase 
general fiscal revenues, but is to compensate expenditure. 
If the cost is 10 thousand RMB and the collected revenue 
totals 50 thousand RMB, then government purpose is to 
create revenues for state general expenditure but not to 
merely operate the service supply department.
In San Juan Cellular Telephone Co. v. Public Service 
Commission of Puerto Rico case, Judge Stephen Breyer 
proposed that the court tended to emphasize the final 
use of collected revenues while dealing cases related to 
the debate over tax and fee, by inquiring whether the 
fiscal revenues were used for general public interests or 
particular interests of supervised companies or supervision 
cost of agency. Such principle is proper for numerous 
cases in history. For instance, in Schneider Transport, Inc. 
v. Cattanach case, the Seventh Circuit Court judged the 
revenue collected by Wisconsin transport agency from 
trucks as tax, by claiming that the collected revenue to be 
used for expressway construction was in the category of 
general public expenditure. In Keleher v. New England 
case, the Second Circuit Court judged “franchise fee” 
in public institution as tax, for the reason that collected 
charge was part of the general fiscal revenues of the city. 
While on the other hand, in Head Money Cases, the 
Supreme Judicial Court judged that the $ 0.5 revenue 
collected from every passenger was not tax since it was 
used to compensate immigrant management expenditure; 
In Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission case, the Fifth Circuit Court 
judged that the revenue collected by nuclear regulatory 
commission was fee instead of tax because it was used 
to compensate charge in licensing procedures such as 
“environmental review”, “hearing”, “administrative and 
technical support”; In Wisconsin v. Yellow Freight System 
case, the Seventh Circuit Court judged the revenue 
collected by Wisconsin transport agency from trucks as 
fee rather than tax because the collection purpose was 
primarily to compensate supervision expenditure and 
appraise the qualification of trucks. 
2. RELATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT 
COLLECTED CHARGE AND SUPPLIED 
SERVICES OR VESTED INTERESTS 
Another vital difference between tax and administrative 
fee rests in the relation between government collected 
charge and supplied services or vested interests. As 
a general rule, tax is public debts without reciprocal 
payment, while fee is reciprocal payment of specific 
public services. (Xiong & Liu, 2004) Tax is not collected 
to compensate specific interests. In principle, tax revenue 
is not bound up with specific management or use 
purposes, but is generally incorporated into public budget.
( Chen Qingxiu.1997)In another word, because tax is 
based on the common remuneration for public sacrifice, 
the government does not directly pay for the public for 
taxation and spends tax revenues in general payment like 
national defense, diplomacy, and public security. Such 
type of payment is non-related to specific individuals, 
which implies that state payment for sake of public 
interests does not aim to satisfy or increase personal 
interests. Comparatively speaking, administrative fee 
is the consideration payment of specific administrative 
payment, (Chen, 1997) which often takes government 
services or vested interests as the premise. On account 
of individual remuneration principle, the government 
collects corresponding consideration from service or 
interest beneficiary so as to compensate cost. There exists 
consideration relation characteristic of direct remuneration 
between collection and payment. 
In Finance, tax possesses three prominent properties, 
including non-gratuitous property. The non-gratuitous 
property of tax indicates that the state does not have to 
pay tax revenues back nor compensate taxpayers in any 
form. (Lu, 2013) In Law Theory, tax is defined to be 
certain payment shortage of consideration. State fiscal 
payment for the public, or supply of public goods can 
not be quantified in legal terms, or act as any certain and 
executable relief legal right by now. As a result, tax just 
means sacrifice or obligation or money payment without 
consideration on the part of tax payers. (Xiong & Li, 2004) 
In another word, tax has nothing to do with payment. The 
fundamental difference between administration fee and 
tax is its gratuitous property. (Zhang, 2014) The gratuitous 
property of administrative fee suggests interest “reciprocal 
payment” among subjects in specific relation. It highlights 
that administrative counterparts are able to earn interests 
from administrative agencies more or less after paying 
fee. (Zhang, 2014)To put it simply, there exists reciprocal 
payment in administrative fee. Accordingly, it is 
inappropriate for some scholars to equal administrative 
fee to after tax in non-gratuitous property. (Ying, 1998)
Consideration collected by the government from 
specific individuals for services or invested interests is 
actually fee with reciprocal payment. In reality, there 
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exists a close connection between interests or services 
favored by individuals and their paid charge. Taking 
garbage fee for example, garbage processing service is 
closely related to garbage fee. Such connection is not 
applicable between national defense, diplomacy, public 
security and tax. From this view, it can be fitly concluded 
that determining the existence of reciprocal payment is 
determining whether there is a close connection between 
interests or services and paid charge.  
It is easy to differentiate tax and fee in some typical 
cases. However, the boundary between the two turns 
increasingly obscure especially after the rise of some 
purpose taxes and special charges in recent years. City 
maintenance and construction tax is a typical example. 
Capital of city maintenance and construction tax is 
exclusively appropriated for the maintenance and 
construction of city public utilities and facilities. This is 
totally different from general tax. The purpose of general 
tax is uncertain as it may be applied in national defense, 
diplomacy or public security. Why is city maintenance 
and construction tax a purpose tax instead of fee? In the 
first place, city maintenance and construction tax aims 
to provide long-term interests for the city and overall 
citizens as the source of public improvement capital. 
Therefore, it does not merely benefit tax payers. All city 
residents become the beneficiaries of public utilities 
and facilities, and nearly every person in the city acts as 
the user of public improvement. However, it should be 
noted that fee in real sense is not to create  benefits for 
the public, but just in the service of few “payers”, such 
as city infrastructure supporting fee oriented towards 
units or individuals involved in newly built or expansion 
buildings. The government constructs water supply, fuel 
gas, sewage treatment facilities for the convenience of 
newly built or expansion building owners. Probably 
the government ignores whether people really benefit 
from city infrastructure supporting fees and weakens the 
intimacy between public paid charge and public interests. 
As a matter of fact, it is just public improvement cost used 
to compensate specific real estate interests. 
In summary, there are three criteria in defining 
whether there exists any close connection between public 
charge and interests or services, including (a) whether 
government activities increase and meet the interests 
of specific individuals; (b) whether government merely 
collects charge from interests beneficiaries; (c) whether 
collected charge simply compensate activity cost. 
3 .   TA X AT I O N  O N  C A PA B I L I T Y 
P R I N C I P L E  A N D  C O S T  O R  F E E 
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE
As stated by the second point above, one of the major 
differences between tax and fee is that tax lacks the 
property of reciprocal payment and fee is the reciprocal 
payment of specific administrative payment. (Chen, 1997) 
Since tax lacks individual reciprocal payment, it cannot 
measure the value of reciprocal payment, but can only 
determine the tax liability of tax payers according to their 
economic affordability in line with “capability payment 
principle”. Under this principle, the government needs to 
evaluate tax payers’ affordability for specific types of tax. 
(Ge, 2005) On this basis, tax rate is determined by “taxation 
on capability principle” in measuring taxation liability. As 
fee includes individual reciprocal payment, it is directly 
bound up with individual interests. In case of limited state 
resources, if resource use right is exclusive to specific 
individuals, the fee generated by individuals or groups 
should be paid by benefited individuals or groups in 
accordance with “user payment principle” or “beneficiary 
payment principle”. The payment liability should be 
measured with “cost or fee compensation principle” or “fee 
coverage principle” in principle. (Chen, 1997)
As stated by the first point above, because the main 
purpose of administrative fee is to compensate the cost of 
specific activities for sake of individuals, the collection 
criterion should be determined as per practical cost 
expenditure. If there is a surplus above the cost, it is 
suspicious whether the fee is collected to increase fiscal 
revenues. Hence, “cost or fee compensation principle” 
demands the match of collected fee with specific activity 
cost. In above BOLT v. CITY OF LANSING case, the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Michigan judged that the storm 
water service charge levied by the defendant Lansing 
Municipal Government was not to simply compensate 
supervision cost, but to provide long-term beneficiary 
public improvement for the city and all citizens. 
Moreover, government revenues exceeded the direct and 
indirect civil use cost of the storm water service charge in 
future thirty years. Obviously, because government charge 
was disproportionate to supplied services and vested 
interests, it was tax. Taiwan scholar Chen Qingxiu puts 
forward that “under the condition where revenues above 
charge or benefit charge consideration are used as general 
budget, benefit burden may be converted to tax.” (Chen, 
1997)
Nevertheless, not all charges should adhere to the “cost 
or fee compensation principle”. Regulatory franchise 
charge is an exception. Since it partially belongs to 
economic regulation inducement subjected to charge, it is 
free from the restriction of “cost compensation principle”. 
It is certain that regulatory charge should rigorously abide 
by legal reservation principle. In addition to its regulatory 
inductivity functions, such regulatory franchise charge 
could also build market orders for finite environment 
resources (Ge, 1997)
4.  COERCIVENESS 
Tax possesses the property of coerciveness either in 
Finance or Law. However, it remains controversial about 
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whether fee is coercive in nature. Some scholars sum 
up the coercive, non-gratuitous and fixed properties of 
tax. Comparatively speaking, except fixed property, 
fee does not possess the other two properties exclusive 
to tax. (Zhang, 2014) In the opinion of some scholars, 
“the premise of fee is specific service offered by 
related department and unit to the society. Although 
fee is exchangeable, it lacks coversiveness, fixity, 
gratuitousness. Moreover, owing to its poor organization 
functions, fee can never be the mainstream source of 
state fiscal revenues. To the opposite, it only performs 
the complementary role.”(Li & Xiao, 2002) Some 
scholars directly point out that “fee is voluntary, but 
tax is coercive”. 35 Some scholars emphasize that “the 
coerciveness of charge should not be denied just because 
people can autonomously decide whether to apply for 
certain service from the government as required. Charge 
is not generated based on private law contract, but public 
law liability instead. The formation condition, limit, 
procedure, duration of charge all take into effect at the 
sole discretion of state agency. Therefore, charge is 
coercive with no doubt” (Liu & Xiong, 2017).
4.1  Loophole in the “Voluntary” View of 
Administrative Fee 
Among above opinions, some scholars come up with 
the thinking that fee is voluntary and tax is coercive. 
But no reason has been given yet. In American judicial 
precedents, the court also used to list “voluntariness” as 
the criterion to different tax and fee. In 1995, in BOLT 
v. CITY OF LANSING case, the defendant Lansing 
Municipal Government intended to build a new storm 
water sewage system to separate it from sanitary water 
sewage water for fear that the storm led to the paralysis of 
city sewage system and discharged untreated sewage into 
the river. Accordingly, Lansing City founded a foundation 
to help establish, operate and maintain the sewage system, 
and raised 50% capital from residents under the pretext of 
storm water service charge.  The plaintiff BOLT deemed 
the charge as government taxation in nature which should 
be decided by public referendum. While the practice for 
Lansing City to directly collect the charge violated the 
Constitution. Therefore, the charge was invalid legally. 
Eventually, the Supreme Judicial Court in Michigan 
agreed the claim of the plaintiff and judged the charge 
as tax rather than fee. At the same time, it also indicated 
three criteria used to differentiate tax and fee, including 
voluntariness. Since tax is coercively levied by the law, 
but charge is legally binding on service users who can 
decide the use of service, storm water service charge 
in this case does not comply with the “voluntariness” 
criterion. To be specific, this is because the charge 
is levied coercively and owners are not allowed to 
independently determine whether to use the service (storm 
water sewage system) or control the use of the service.
In Stewart v. Verde River Irrigation & Power Dist 
case, the plaintiff submitted a permission application to 
irrigate land and generate power with Verde river water, 
and paid $3 permission fee for this. Afterwards, the water 
commissioner charged $10970.4 from the plaintiff for 
final permission. However, the plaintiff demanded refund 
for many times after payment, wondering whether the 
charge was or tax. The Supreme Judicial Court of Arizona 
viewed it as fee and discussed the difference between fee 
and tax. Tax was coercively levied by the government 
from offeree without any need to solicit consent, but fee 
was voluntary all the time because fee payer paid to civil 
servants to enjoy services and interests non-accessible 
to other social members. First of all, unless individuals 
claims the government to afford certain service, they will 
not be charged anyway. This shows that individuals do 
not need to pay if they do not ask for service. Secondly, 
if the payer proposes concrete requirement of service, the 
government must offer particular interests to the payer 
different from general public.
In addition to above two precedents, such view 
could be also found from precedents in other states. For 
instance, in Executive Aircraft Consulting, Inc. v. City 
of Newto case, The Supreme Judicial Court of Maryland 
approved that fee was voluntary as individuals had the 
right to refuse to pay by the non-use of service, interests 
or privilege. In Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court case, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine presented that 
voluntariness was an additional property of fee, and 
fee was the consideration paid by the general public 
for exclusive interests. More importantly, considering 
the voluntariness of fee, individuals could avoid 
payment by refusing the service. In Eastern Diversified 
Properties, Inc. v. Montgomery County case, the court 
in Maryland ascertained four characteristics of fee, 
including voluntariness. Therefore, the court judged the 
“development impact fee” levied by MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY, MARYLAND as tax, for the reason that 
the plaintiff did not pay the fee voluntarily. In Silva v. 
City of Attleboro case, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts supplemented another two conventional 
characteristics of fee. One of the characteristic was 
selectivity. Now that payers were able to refuse the use of 
government services, they could avoid such fee.
Thus it can be seen that the voluntariness of fee 
enables individuals to independently decide whether 
to apply for certain service from the government as 
required, or avoid payment by choosing free government 
service. It follows that despite the “benefits” of service, 
individuals have the right of decision. If individuals 
voluntarily refuse the benefits, they naturally do not 
have to undertake the liability of payment. But pursuant 
to this logic, people may also avoid tax as long as they 
want. For instance, people may avoid consumption tax 
by refusing consumption, avoid property tax by refusing 
revenues, and avoid act tax by refusing specific actions. 
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American Prof. Laurie Reynolds also notice the limitation 
of such logic because many tax categories may be inferred 
to be voluntary. For avoiding income tax, tax payers 
only need to stop earning revenues. (Laurie, 2004) As 
indicated by American Tax Foundation report How Is the 
Money Used? Federal and State Cases Distinguishing 
Taxes and Fees written by Joseph Bishop-Henchman, it 
is partial to differentiate tax and fee by reference to the 
criterion “voluntariness” because it mixes charge payment 
and basic service payment. People can voluntarily buy 
products, but they do not voluntarily pay consumption tax 
in transaction. It is a voluntary choice to use tollway, but 
it is not related to the differentiation of fee and tax. Fee is 
used to compensate the cost of service for payers, but not 
to increase general government revenues. (Joseph, 2013)
On the other hand, in some cases, individuals do not 
have any freedom to voluntarily choose service, such 
as special assessments. As a fee levied for specific real 
estate, special assessments is used in public improvement 
that directly benefits specific real estate, such as street, 
illumination, irrigation system, sewer, sewerage system or 
flood control facility. Its coerciveness lies in the fact that 
tax payers cannot freely determine whether to accept the 
service, and the quantity and degree of service. Especially, 
the rationality of special assessments is that assessed 
property obtains specific interests more than general 
public. The general public should not be required to pay 
for the specific interests exclusive to the minority, and by 
the same token, the few beneficiaries should not obtain 
general public sponsorship. In reality, it is a cost spent in 
public improvement to compensate specific real estate 
interests. It is also a coercive charge fundamentally. In 
BOLT v. CITY OF LANSING case, although the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Michigan proposed the voluntariness 
of fee, it also admitted difficulties in the application of 
voluntariness criterion because it forced “9-1-1 emergency 
fee”, “sewer use fee” and “garbage collection fee” to be 
questioned. In consequence, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Michigan recognized that fee was coercive in some cases. 
From this point of view, a conclusion may be drawn that 
the voluntary property of administrative fee was defective. 
For this reason, courts in other states of America also 
gradually deny the voluntariness of fee. In Sinclair Paint 
Co. v. State Board of Equalization case, the government 
charged a fee from the plaintiff Sinclair lead-based material 
manufacturer for offering medical service to latent lead 
poisoning children. Concerning the differentiation of 
tax and fee in this case, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
California deemed it as a typical regulatory fee because 
collection purpose was to compensate government cost 
in assessing and screening latent lead poisoning children 
and follow-up service, rather than to pay to Sinclair and 
other lead manufacturers. Regulatory fee levied by the 
government with police power did not give interests to 
payers nor endow payers with privilege. In summary, 
regulatory fee is not voluntary, but is coercively levied 
from payers according to government regulatory 
planning. In above case, the Supreme Judicial Court 
of California also refuses to list “voluntariness” as the 
characteristic of fee owing to the possible legitimacy of 
coercive fee. In City of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders 
Ass’n case, the court also implied that the regulatory 
fee was used to compensate the cost of government in 
executing regulatory right, and such cost was allotted 
to subjects who voluntarily or non-voluntarily accepted 
specific government supervision. The fee covered public 
expenditures related to inspection, recording and approval. 
More importantly, the rate was precisely determined by 
the cost paid by payers for specific regulation.
In Kootenai County Property Ass’n v. Kootenai 
County case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Idaho briefly 
stated that “the appellor thought fee as the consideration 
voluntarily paid by payers for specific service, and tax 
as non-voluntary charge collected for general public 
interests. But the legislative agency might demand citizens 
to accept its specific service and levy the charge as per its 
police power.” This showed the disapproval attitudes of 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Idaho against voluntariness 
criterion and its acknowledgement of coercive charge The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Colorado also explicitly refuted 
the voluntary property of fee, claiming that no service fee 
was voluntary legally. The key to differentiate tax and 
fee was not the voluntariness of fee. What counted was 
whether the fee was rationally charged to counteract the 
general cost of service.
4.2  Coerciveness of Administrative Fee 
Since some scholars demonstrate that fee is non-coercive 
comparing with tax, the paper will firstly analyze the 
implications of tax coerciveness. As a general rule, tax 
coerciveness falls into two stages. The first stage is the 
formation stage where tax is generated coercively and 
predetermined in legal terms. Tax payers ought to pay tax 
in response to the regulations in Tax Law. Therefore, tax 
is coercively levied by the government from counterparts 
without consent, and counterparts do not have any other 
choice. The second stage is the implementation stage 
where the state has the right of intervention if tax payers 
refuse to pay tax. If tax authority is vested with coercive 
executive right, it does not have to report to the court. If 
tax authority does not have coercive executive right, it 
must file application to the court and request the court 
to coercively levy tax with civil enforcement. In brief, 
the coerciveness of tax could be manifested by the two 
stages. At this point, it is also the case for administrative 
fee. In the formation stage of administrative fee, the force 
of formation condition, limit, procedure and duration of 
administrative fee are all solely decided by state agency, 
and counterparts do not have any choice for payment. 
Following the formation of administrative fee, if payers 
refuse payment, administrative agency also has the right 
of coercive enforcement or applies to People’s Court for 
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coercive enforcement. Therefore, under the framework 
of legal theories, coerciveness of tax also exists in 
administrative fee. Therefore, the paper considers that it 
is inappropriate to conclude that fee is not coercive by 
comparing it with the coercive, fixed and non-gratuitous 
property of tax. 
In summary, it is wrong to differentiate tax and fee by 
coerciveness. First of all, fee is voluntary. The premise 
of non-coerciveness is whether people can determine 
to accept government service at their will. However, 
regulatory fee, such as bank regulatory fee, security and 
futures regulatory fee, insurance regulatory fee, does not 
take the voluntary or non-voluntary acceptance of payer 
as the premise. Instead, it is coercively levied by the 
government according to its regulatory responsibilities. 
Likewise, city infrastructure supporting fee pertains to 
special assessments or benefit charge from the perspective 
of Comparative Law. Its coverciveness lies in the fact 
that the payer cannot freely determine whether to accept 
the service, as well as the quantity and degree of service. 
Secondly, under the framework of legal theories, the 
coerciveness of charge should not be denied because 
people have the right to independently decide whether 
to apply for certain service as required. Charge does 
not generate based on private law contract, but public 
law obligation instead. The formation condition, limit, 
procedure, duration of charge all take into effect at the 
sole discretion of state agency. Therefore, charge is 
coercive with no doubt” (Xiong & Liu, 2004)
CONCLUSION
Above all, the main differences between tax and fee 
should be investigated from three aspects. The first one 
is the difference in collection purpose. The purpose 
or attached purpose of government tax collection is to 
increase fiscal revenues, and offer general and ordinary 
government services to the public. While the purpose to 
collect fee is to make up the cost in specific services for 
sake of individuals. Secondly, tax refers to public debts 
without reciprocal payment, while fee refers to reciprocal 
payment of specific public services. Thirdly, tax 
compliant with “capability payment principle” determines 
tax rate according to “taxation on capability principle” 
in measuring taxation liability. While by contrast, fee 
compliant with “user payment principle” or “beneficiary 
payment principle” determines rate according to “cost or 
fee compensation principle” or “fee coverage principle” in 
measuring payment liability. 
From the perspective of Comparative Law, Taiwan 
divides fee into three categories, namely charge, benefit 
charge and special common tax, and compares it with tax. 
In view of the insignificant difference between charge 
and benefit charge, the two are collaboratively referred to 
as benefit burden. The prime difference between benefit 
burden and tax can be proved by two points. Firstly, tax is 
public debts without reciprocal payment, while charge is 
reciprocal payment of specific public services. Secondly, 
since the state should not invest tax in profit-earning 
activities, it also has no right to charge extra revenues 
for specific services. This is in strict accordance with the 
“cost or fee compensation principle” where beneficiaries 
undertake the cost. It is essentially different from the “user 
payment principle” and “taxation on capability principle”.
( Ge Kechang,1997) special common tax is an evolving 
fiscal form which has not be defined yet. Whereas, the 
difference between special common tax and tax is that the 
former does not support general state fiscal revenues (non-
overall planning) nor charge general tax payers. In another 
word, special common tax should be treated as special 
state task oriented towards specific groups, and it should 
not be incorporated into specific fund in government 
budget. Regardless of the slight difference between benefit 
burden and special common tax, the difference between 
tax and fee is similar to above-mentioned three points in 
this section. 
In America, differentiation of tax and fee is a perpetual 
issue in precedent. However, throughout development 
for many years, a set of criteria have been formed in this 
regard: (a). the purpose for the government to collect 
tax is to increase fiscal revenues, while the purpose to 
collect fee is to make up the cost in specific services for 
individuals. (b). whether collected charge is rationally 
related to government service cost or payers’ practical 
interests. (c). whether government collected charge is 
only used to satisfy payers’ requirements or increase their 
interests. Although the criterion is expressed in another 
way, it is consistent with above-mentioned three points in 
this section in nature. 
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